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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 13-1702 
 ___________ 
 
 YINHAI SHEN, 
                 Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
   Respondent 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A087-789-295) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Annie S. Garcy 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 3, 2013 
 
 Before: AMBRO, JORDAN and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: July 8, 2013 ) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Yinhai Shen, a citizen of the People’s Republic of China, petitions for review of a 
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision denying her applications for relief from 
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removal.  For the reasons that follow, we will deny the petition in part and dismiss it in 
part. 
I. 
 Shen entered the United States in 2001.  In 2009, she applied for asylum and 
related relief based on her fear of “political persecution by the Chin[ese] communist 
government.”  Administrative Record (A.R.) 249.1  Her claim appeared to be grounded in 
both her Korean ethnicity and her membership in the Chinese Democracy Justice Party 
(CDJP), which she allegedly joined in 2009 and for which she claimed to have written six 
publicly available articles that included her real name.  She explained that police had 
visited her parents’ house in China and had threatened them because of her “criminal 
activities” in support of the CDJP.  See A.R. 249–50.  The affidavit in support of her 
application also detailed numerous instances of purported anti-CDJP persecution by the 
Chinese government.  See A.R. 251.  Later, in 2010, Shen was served with a Notice to 
Appear asserting her inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), a charge she 
conceded and whose validity is not currently before us.  See A.R. 46, 337.   
 After hearing testimony and accepting evidence, the Immigration Judge (IJ) 
denied Shen’s applications for relief from removal.  The IJ pointed to several 
                                                 
1
 There is some ambiguity in the record regarding whether Shen ever actually applied for 
relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).  She did not check the “Torture 
Convention” box on her I-589, and her attorney suggested that she was applying for 
asylum and withholding of removal relief only.  See, e.g., A.R. 47, 230.  Because the 
agency addressed Shen’s eligibility for CAT relief, we will do so as well. 
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inconsistencies in Shen’s materials and testimony, finding both that she had not testified 
credibly and that she had failed to adequately corroborate her claim.  See A.R. 37–39.  
Because Shen’s claim was neither corroborated nor credible, she could not “prove that 
she [met] an exception to the one-year” asylum-filing deadline.  A.R. 40.  In the 
alternative, asylum relief would not be granted because Shen had failed to meet her 
burden of proof, a flaw that also undermined her withholding and CAT claims.  A.R. 40–
42.   
 On appeal, the BIA agreed with the IJ.  It held that Shen had “not establish[ed] 
with credible evidence the occurrence of the events that allegedly led her to file for 
asylum,” and thus did not show “changed personal circumstances or changed conditions 
in China” that would excuse the late filing of her asylum application.  A.R. 3.  The IJ’s 
adverse credibility determination was ruled to be “not clearly erroneous,” because the IJ 
“properly considered the totality of the circumstances in finding that [Shen] lacked 
credibility based on her demeanor, the discrepancies in the record, the lack of 
corroborative evidence, and the implausibility” of portions of her testimony.  A.R. 3.  The 
BIA further concluded that Shen had “otherwise failed to meet her burden of proof for 
the relief or protection requested,” in part because she “did not sufficiently explain the 
absence of multiple pieces of reasonably available corroboration”; moreover, it held that 
the IJ appropriately conducted the three-part Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542 (3d Cir. 
2001), inquiry in requiring corroboration.  A.R. 4.  The BIA therefore affirmed the denial 
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of relief.  Shen timely sought our review of the BIA’s decision. 
II. 
 Subject to the exception we discuss further below, we have jurisdiction pursuant to 
8 U.S.C. § 1252.  “Where the BIA issues a decision on the merits, we review only the 
BIA’s decision[; h]owever, we will look to the IJ’s analysis to the extent that the BIA 
deferred to or adopted it.”  Calla-Collado v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 680, 683 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(per curiam).  We will reverse the BIA’s factual findings only if there is evidence so 
compelling that no reasonable factfinder could conclude as the BIA did.  Id. (citations 
omitted).  Issues of law are reviewed de novo, subject to applicable principles of 
deference.  Id. (citations omitted).  Because these proceedings began after May 11, 2005, 
the REAL ID Act applies.  Yuan v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 420, 424 n.6 (3d Cir. 2011). 
III. 
We turn first to the issue of timeliness.  “Under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B), an alien 
must file an asylum application within one year of h[er] arrival in the United States,” but 
an alien may be excused from timely filing if she demonstrates “to the satisfaction of the 
Attorney General either the existence of changed circumstances which materially affect 
[her] eligibility for asylum or extraordinary circumstances relating to the delay in filing 
an application.”  Jarbough v. Att’y Gen., 483 F.3d 184, 188 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting 8 
U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D) in part; internal quotation marks omitted).  However, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1158(a)(3) strips us of jurisdiction “to review a determination that an asylum petition 
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was not filed within the one year limitations period, and that such period was not tolled 
by extraordinary circumstances.”  Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  
The REAL ID act partially restores jurisdiction “to review constitutional claims and 
questions of law.”  Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627, 634 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D)).  But “despite the changes of the REAL ID Act, factual or 
discretionary determinations continue to fall outside the jurisdiction of the court of 
appeals entertaining a petition for review.”  Id. 
 In determining that Shen had not filed her application in a timely fashion, the BIA 
appeared to defer to the IJ’s timeliness analysis—and the IJ held that Shen “cannot 
credibly prove that she meets an exception to the one-year filing date,” in part because 
she had “not corroborated” part of her “not credible” story.  A.R. 40 (emphasis added).  
Adverse credibility determinations are findings of fact.  See Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 
330 F.3d 587, 597 (3d Cir. 2003).  We therefore conclude that 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3) 
prevents us from exercising jurisdiction over the agency’s asylum determination, and we 
will dismiss this part of the petition for review.
2
  As the “time bar does not apply to 
requests for withholding of removal or relief under the CAT,” we may reach those claims 
despite the asylum application’s untimeliness.  Abulashvili v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 197, 
202 n.6 (3d Cir. 2011) 
                                                 
2
 We note, however, that we can review the credibility determination in the context of 
withholding of removal and CAT relief.  
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 Although the BIA explicitly affirmed the IJ’s credibility determination, it held, in 
the alternative, that Shen “otherwise failed to meet her burden of proof for the relief or 
protection requested.”  A.R. 4.  To qualify for mandatory withholding of removal, an 
alien must show that it is “more likely than not” that her life or freedom would be 
imperiled if she returned to her country because of, inter alia, her political opinion.  Kaita 
v. Att’y Gen., 522 F.3d 288, 296 (3d Cir. 2008).  “An applicant for relief on the merits 
under the [CAT] bears the burden of establishing ‘that it is more likely than not that he or 
she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.’”  Sevoian v. 
Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 174–75 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2)).   
We agree with the BIA that Shen failed to meet her burden of proof for both 
withholding of removal and CAT protection.  The crux of Shen’s claim was that her 
activity in support of the CJDP had attracted police attention, in the form of threatening 
visits to her parents.  A.R. 249–50.  Yet she failed to provide any corroboration of this 
portion of her story.  Although uncorroborated testimony alone may satisfy the burden of 
proof, “the trier of fact may weigh it along with other record evidence and may request 
that the applicant provide corroborating evidence, which the applicant must do unless he 
‘does not have the evidence and cannot reasonably obtain it.’”  Yuan, 642 F.3d at 424 n.6 
(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii)); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(C) (incorporating 
asylum burden of proof standard—including the corroboration element—into the 
withholding of removal analysis).  The facts of the police visits to Shen’s parents are 
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arguably “central” to her claim.  See Chukwu v. Att’y Gen., 484 F.3d 185, 192 (3d Cir. 
2007).  And while Shen argues that she explained why she was unable to obtain any 
verification of these visits, the agency held that there was “no satisfactory explanation for 
its absence,” Sandie v. Att’y Gen., 562 F.3d 246, 252 (3d Cir. 2009), and we are not 
otherwise “compelled to conclude that such corroborating evidence [wa]s unavailable,” 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4).  She thus failed to show that persecution upon return to China was 
“more likely than not.”  The record otherwise contains absolutely no indication that Shen 
was clearly at risk of being tortured if returned to China.  Because substantial record 
evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Shen failed to meet her burden of proof, the 
agency’s decision must stand.  We therefore need not reach the adverse credibility 
determination.
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IV. 
 Having carefully reviewed the record, and finding the agency’s decision to be 
supported by substantial evidence, we will deny the petition for review in part and 
dismiss it in part. 
                                                 
3
 The IJ acknowledged that “credibility and corroboration are different . . . 
considerations,” but stated that it was “difficult to avoid overlapping the . . . analysis of 
credibility with the . . . analysis of corroboration in this case.”  A.R. 37.  We have 
generally cautioned against the “conflation of credibility and corroboration.”  Obale v. 
Att’y Gen., 453 F.3d 151, 163 (3d Cir. 2006), superseded on other grounds as stated in 
Patel v. Att’y Gen., 619 F.3d 230, 234 (3d Cir. 2010).  Here, because the BIA was able to 
unravel the discrete strands of analysis for corroboration, credibility, and substantive 
relief, we are able to base our decision on the first and the third without examining the 
second. 
